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I. Introduction
Somalia is still in a protracted political limbo as it enters its fifteenth
year of “statelessness.”2 Despite the precarious situation of Somali refugees scattered across many parts of the world, both the country and
the plight of its refugees remain off the radar of the world media. The
atrocities committed in the process of the overthrow of Siyaad Barre’s
regime in 1991, and the clanistic power struggles that followed, led to
the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Somalis. The refugees
initially fled to the neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and
Kenya, subsequently moving on to countries near and far. Those who
were fortunate enough to escape the trials and tribulations inherent in
exile in countries such as Kenya, where existing resources are barely
able to meet the basic needs of the native population and where most
refugees still remain in closed camps, moved on to more prosperous
countries where they obtained refugee status. Most were not so fortunate, however.3
The focus of this essay is the approximately 130,000 Somali refugees who remain in limbo in camps in the North Eastern Province
of Kenya (NEP).4 Dadaab, a name given to three camps (Hagadera,
Ifo, and Dhagahley), is located about 100 kilometers from the SomaliKenya border. These camps were created in mid-1992, after it became
almost impossible for the international humanitarian regime to run the
camps in Liboi, a border region too close to southern Somalia, where
violence still occurred on a daily basis. Security concerns for interna-
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tional staff, refugees, and humanitarian supplies all led to the creation
of new camps further inside Kenyan territory. The region where the
Dadaab camps are located is semi-arid and was sparsely populated
by nomadic Somali-Kenyans before the arrival of refugees fleeing the
war. There have been hostilities between Kenya and Somalia ever since
independence in the early 1960s, the latter claiming the Somali-inhabited Northern Frontier District (NFD) as a missing Somali territory and
supporting regional independence movements. Due to this tension,
Kenya kept the NFD, now known as the Northeastern Province of
Kenya, and its population under a permanent state of emergency from
independence until 1992.5
The scale of refugee flight across the Kenyan border in the early
1990s overwhelmed both the small local nomadic population and the
scarce natural resources of the area. The presence of international organizations nevertheless brought this previously marginalized region
some attention with the provision of services such as boreholes, hospitals, and schools. By March 2003, about 160,000 of the more than
400,000 Somali refugees who fled to Kenya at the height of the war
remained there. Of these, 130,000 were in the three Dadaab camps,
with smaller numbers in the Kakuma camps in Northwestern Kenya,
and the remainder living in urban centers like Nairobi. The United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) administers the
camps, with CARE responsible for social services, the World Food Program (WFP) for food, and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) for health
care.6
This study examines the roles and responsibilities of those charged
with caring for refugees in camps in Somalia’s neighboring countries.
The argument here is that encampment and protracted refugee situations leave thousands of men, women, and children living in limbo,
resulting in wasted human capacity and acute diminution of human
dignity. Research in Dadaab found that refugees are dismayed by their
dependency on inadequate aid and express the loss of a sense of selfworth due to their inability to better their situation or to escape from
the dire conditions of camp life. The failure of the host state and the
international community to bring about any effective intervention to
free refugees from such a condition is also examined. Here, the emphasis is on the neglect of the Kenyan Government, as a signatory state to
many human rights and refugee covenants, to enforce the refugees’
legal rights under international law. Any positive and proactive commitment on the part of this Government, I suggest, would have gone a
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long way to alleviate the refugees’ predicament. Finally, I submit that
the international refugee regime’s mantra of durable solutions—reintegration, resettlement, and repatriation—as the only viable options
often translates to no solution and only leads to a protracted condition,
as demonstrated by the situation in which refugees find themselves.
Refusal to explore other options for addressing the refugee crisis (other
than basic maintenance) has devastating consequences for displaced
populations.
II. Encampment: Dependency, Deprivations, and Refugee “Persona”
Humanitarian organizations, upon their arrival in disaster zones,
rarely have the luxury to assess whether camps are the best option to
address human catastrophes.7 Once camps are created, however, the
transit that was initially hoped for often turns out to have been wishful thinking, as shown by the many cases of protracted refugee situations in the last two decades.8 Examples of refugees in limbo for over
a decade include “Tigrayans and Eritreans in Sudan, Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, Salvadorians in Honduras, Cambodians and Laotians in
Thailand, Mozambicans in Malawi, Angolans in Zaire, and Vietnamese boat people in different countries in Southeast Asia.”9 One should
add Rwandans in Tanzania and Somalis in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti,
and Yemen. On paper, the UNHCR claims that, “the establishment of
refugee camps must be only a last resort. A solution that maintains and
fosters the self-reliance of the refugees is always preferable.”10 Nevertheless, camps become the first choice to “manage” a refugee crisis.
Certainly difficulties abound for the humanitarian community in managing and assisting people dispersed over a vast area in emergency
situations; yet, as I will demonstrate, falling back on camps as the only
solution for the administration of humanitarian assistance means turning a blind eye on the short-term and long-term detrimental effects on
refugees.
Camps are often established in peripheral regions, which leads
to segregation and marginalization of refugees.11 The international
humanitarian organizations administering these camps have different
cultural norms, linguistic backgrounds, and political concerns than
the people under their care. To be sure, refugees in the crisis phase
welcome the assistance strangers bestow upon them and remain acquiescent to camp regimentation. However, once the emergency period
passes, with camps entering a maintenance phase, refugees experi-
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ence few changes in the routines of scheduled ration distributions,
head counts, and visits of international dignitaries. Resentment and
conflict with the aid apparatus follows.12 Aggravating these inadequacies further is the prohibition of freedom of movement to which refugees in closed camps are subjected, a constraint that greatly hampers
the ability to seek alternative livelihood strategies outside the camps.
Coupled with the difficulties international humanitarian organizations
experience in raising sufficient funds to administer the camps with
adequate provisions beyond the emergency phase, this renders the
camps domains of high material scarcity.
Arguments against this type of encampment include that camps
engender passivity, breaking down all initiative and sense of self-worth of
refugees. The hand-to-mouth arrangement of waiting for others to provide for one’s needs eventually translates to complete dependency on
donations.13 However, while acknowledging the importance of these
rations for refugees whose other options are constrained both by the
environment of camp locations and national laws prohibiting or limiting employment prospects, some researchers contest this “dependency
syndrome.”14 Instead, Kibreab, using Somali-Ethiopian refugees in
Somalia in the 1970s and 1980s as an example, writes:
[t]he majority of refugees in the camps were willing to expend their
labour on economic activities, often for very small return, and also, in
some cases, to take the risk of relinquishing their ration cards for the
uncertain alternative of self-sufficiency. Among the able bodied refugees,
there was no evidence at all that the refugees’ willingness to take initiatives and to work hard either to earn an income or to augment their diet
was negatively affected by prolonged dependency on handouts.15

Clark also refutes the concept of a dependency syndrome. Instead, he
asserts that, “the apparent dependency of refugees derives from their
removal from their social, political and economic coping systems.”16
While dependency is acknowledged, the reasons refugees may become
dependent are contested: instead of “laziness” or “welfare mentality,”
this argument partly points to the structural constraints inherent in
camp life, equated with Goffmanesque “total institutions.”17 Despite
the different rationales for dependency, a consensus exists within the
scholarly literature about the suffering of refugees in “closed camps,”
who live in limbo and rely on dwindling rations for years on end. Due
to the disruption of refugees’ social and economic networks, long-term
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encampment further negatively impacts the future reintegration of refugees into their home countries.18
Research among Afghanis in Pakistan found that more than the
social dislocation of being outside of their home country, “what is
disruptive and potentially most threatening to Pashtun refugees is not
social dislocation so much as the contradictions posed by the framing
experience of becoming—in multiple senses of the word—refugees.”19
This last finding emphasizes the disempowerment that refugees experience when they no longer toil on their land or survive by their sweat
but wait around for food distribution, perceived as nonreciprocal charity bestowed upon them. Acceptance of these donations is perceived
as being contradictory to the Pashtun culture. Also, research among
Vietnamese refugees in Southeast Asian camps demonstrates that even
more than the enclosure and fences surrounding the camps, what is
most damaging about closed camps is the uncertainty of the refugees’
prospects for leaving the camps and the camp administration’s expectation for refugees to represent themselves as “helpless supplicants
under suspicion.”20
Data collected from Somalis in Dadaab confirms the deprivations
refugees experience in protracted situations. Interviewees detailed the
precariousness of their day-to-day existence, which is, unfortunately,
substantiated by camp administration reports. For example, WFP
often raises alarm bells about the impending starvation of refugees in
Dadaab or in Kenya. The food WFP is able to secure always falls short
of the daily caloric requirement, with both the quantity and quality of
rations falling short. Refugees expressed to this author their frustration
with the situation. Foodstuffs distributed are actually often scorned.
Many argued that the quality of the grains distributed is “not fit for
humans.” Moreover, most research participants dwelled on the lack of
variety in their rations and the cultural inappropriateness of maize as
the main staple provided. “The food distributed per person has now
been reduced to three kilograms of maize per person per fortnight” is a
statement that was reiterated by all. Flour, a staple most Somalis utilize
to prepare laxoox (flat bread), is rarely found in their bimonthly rations.
By the end of my first visit to Dadaab, in August 2001, refugees had
not received flour for almost a whole year. They contrasted this with
the rations they received at the beginning of their arrival in the camps,
which were not only double what they were in 2001, but also included
a variety of grains. During those days, refugees were able to sell some
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of the rations to buy other food items, such as meat, milk, and vegetables, which are not provided by the camp administration.
A refugee diet, which should in theory include pulses and vegetables, in reality rarely contains these, and often results in high rates
of malnutrition among women and children. In that first exploration
in Dadaab in summer 2001, MSF reported a dramatic increase in the
malnutrition rate of Somali refugee children—172 percent within a
period of six months—due to a 35 percent decrease in the general food
distribution in the camps.21 Only those few who receive remittances
from the diaspora and those involved in petty trade/business are able
to supplement the meager rations. “Meat and milk” (cad iyo caano), two
words that together signify subsistence in the Somali language and
originally comprised nomads’ main sources of nutrition, is a luxury
very few refugees can afford. An interesting example illustrating the
precariousness of life is the price of food items in Dadaab. A woman
who sells some of her grain to buy milk for a baby would sell her
maize for five Kenyan shillings per kilogram. However, one glass of
milk costs ten Kenyan shillings.22 For a mother to provide this one
glass for a small child, she would have to sell two kilos of the maize she
received that morning, accounting for two-thirds of the main ration the
child receives for two weeks.
Despite these difficulties, the dependency identified in Dadaab more
closely resembles that discussed by Clarke, namely, loss of “social,
political and economic coping systems,”23 rather than a “welfare mentality” or laziness. Refugees’ own perspectives highlight their lack of
alternatives to distributed rations. As a matter of fact, they dwell on
how employment and/or gaining one’s livelihood are desirable but
impossible in the camp setting. Lack of material resources and employment prospects oblige most to rely solely on the bimonthly rations. For
most refugees who are not involved in trade and who do not receive
remittances, then, dependency on aid remains the only option. However, in spite of camp constraints, I found that refugees still desire and
hope to be freed from the “beggarly” positions they occupy as dependents on insufficient aid. One interviewee reported that she cleaned
the premises of one of the NGOs for free for weeks, until some NGO
staff took notice and a small remuneration was offered to her. This
permitted her to supplement the meager distributed rations for herself
and her four children. This woman demonstrated a tenacity to better
her situation in an environment of scarce resources. All around the
camps, one sees women selling small packets of sugar or spices to
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make just enough to buy a glass of milk for the smallest children. Thus,
as much as representations of camps always show people waiting for
something, almost all expressed the urgent desire to provide for one’s
family. This, in a nutshell, challenges the claim that refugees become
dependent on aid because of an unwillingness to work for their sustenance.
III. Self-Perception: Refugee Identity
Another theme often coupled with the dependency syndrome is the
loss of self-worth that may result from protracted refugee situations.
My investigations in Dadaab strongly support this point. For many,
the implications of being and being called “refugees” were often very
negative. With a sense of grief, most refer to themselves as “qaxooti,”24
a dreaded identity often associated with a degraded sense of self. Here
are a few personal statements to that effect:
• “A refugee is a fenced person.” (Hawa M. Ali)25
• “The word ‘refugee’…in our heads means a weak individual; that
is how we see ourselves. We ourselves don’t like it when we are
called refugees… . But what can you do? It means a weak person, a
person whose country was destroyed; it means a poor person, who
has nothing, who is begging food that is handed down.” (Sa’ida M.
Farah)
• “A person who is sitting somewhere as if he/she was handicapped!
There are no men who are employed in this block, who go to work
in the morning and who gain a living. They are sitting around the
house. They are unemployed. Nowhere to find jobs!” (Aliya S.
Abdi)
• “Refugee is poverty and hunger. A loser standing around, that is a
refugee. I think of poverty, praying to Allah: ‘Allah, take us out of
this misery,’ this suffering and hardship, carrying water on your
bare back, searching for wood in the bushes, lack of milk for your
children, unemployment, that is it.” (Hodan F. Abdirahman)
• “A refugee is someone suffering. A refugee is someone who is in
need. A refugee is someone who has nothing. That is how I interpret the word ‘refugee.’ If we had any way of freeing ourselves, we
would not be in this refugee camp tonight.” (Halima K. Bile)
• “Refugee is not a pleasant word. When someone is told, ‘you are
a refugee,’ it is a word that hurts. A refugee is a person who aban23
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doned his habitat, who lives in a territory that is not his, and who
lives miserably and desperately, constantly worrying… . I mean you
are seen as someone who is less than others, who is worst. So, as
refugees, when we are told, ‘you are a refugee,’ we see it as if we are
despised, weaker and less than other people. It depresses us every
time the word is used. I see it as weak, someone who is not capable
of anything. That is how I see the word ‘refugee.’” (Kaha A. Bihi)
Refugees frequently refer to the constraints on their freedom
of movement in closed camps. People use metaphors drawn from
nomadic animal herding, such as “fenced like livestock.” “Living in a
prison where only the sky is open” is another way they express their
condition. Fencing metaphors symbolize the barriers to the outside
world, thus the barriers to escape the material deprivations intrinsic in
camp life. Many refer to their hope to be freed from the conditions of
“refugeehood.” To this end, both men and women often recite prayers.
However, camp inhabitants, however much they despise the refugee
persona (as illustrated by the images above), also assume this persona
when recounting the harshness of camp life. As Harrell-Bond and others have argued, refugees assume a “victimized” persona after spending a certain time in camps.26 In fact, the conditions existing in Dadaab
render it easy to internalize this persona. Life in the Dadaab camps
means being deprived of both material and physical security, and one
discerns in refugees’ narratives a dilemma: on the one hand they are,
objectively, refugees or “qaxooti;” on the other, they resent what the
word connotes.
IV. Insecurity: Fenced in for the Enemy?
Instead of hospitality, refugees in limbo often experience exploitation, extreme insecurity, and constant harassment, not only from local
populations, but also from national authorities, whose policies fuel
unfavorable sentiments toward the newcomers.27 Such a situation may
partially stem from the hard conditions persisting in refugee-hosting
areas. Local populations in these regions often end up more marginalized than the refugees, who receive international humanitarian aid,
which at least permits them to meet subsistence needs. When excluded
from this aid, host populations tend to resent refugees and view the
newcomers as “enemies” or competitors. Scarce resources, such as
firewood and water, become contested when the sudden population
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increase leads to high consumption of these limited resources.28 However, I argue that conflict with refugees in this situation should not be
interpreted as hostility toward refugees per se. Rather, conflict in areas
where water and pasture are scarce is often the norm. For example,
in the Northeastern province of Kenya, where the Dadaab camps are
located, local Somali-Kenyan populations historically and presently
experience conflict due to a paucity of pasture and water. In such a
context, for refugees to expect “hospitality” beyond the short-term is
unrealistic, even if among a population of the same ethnic background.
In an environment of scarcity, a “survival-of-the-fittest” mentality
envelops all, with refugees often becoming victimized.
The pervasive insecurity in the Dadaab camps therefore illustrates
the often-tense relationship between locals and refugees. Highlighting the scale of this concern, UNHCR reported that, at the height of
gender-based violence, there were 200 documented rapes in Dadaab
in the year 1993. In the subsequent four years, the number of officially recorded rapes averaged between 70 and 105. But rapes again
increased to 164 in 1998, fell to 71 in 1999, rose again to 108 in 2000,
and dropped to 72 in 2001.29 Given the stigma attached to rape within
the Somali culture, reported acts fall far short of the actual number of
cases.30 Most of the rapes in Dadaab occur in the outskirts of the camps,
as the depletion of firewood in this semi-arid region obliges women to
walk further and further in search of sources of energy for cooking.
UNHCR documented over 100 rapes from February to August 2002.31
Most of the perpetrators are allegedly Somali nomads from the area,
deegaanka,32 often referred to as “shiftas.”33
Another example of insecurity is the raiding of the camps by bandits. These incursions coincide with bimonthly ration distributions or
when material donations such as plastic bags are distributed to cover
refugees’ makeshift houses. The bandits often come to grab any valuables they might find, targeting particularly those suspected of owning material goods or receiving remittances and fresh rations. It was
reported that, on certain occasions, shiftas use the women to transport
the looted rations and, when the task is done, rape and at times kill
them on the outskirts of the camps.
One-woman interviewee referred to a rape she witnessed:
I saw it with my own eyes. She was caught and raped at the door, her
pants34 pulled off, a girl of 15 years old, a gang, vagabonds, losers and
shiftas, there you are, you are watching it, you scream, but you cannot
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free her from them, you are standing at your door. The conflict we fled,
yesterday when NGOs (hay’adihii), assisted us, when we got settled,
assisted us well, we thank them for it, we thank Allah for it… . we settled
and our children started schools, when we would have done something
for ourselves, an enemy was born (cadow baa dhulkii oo dhan ka dhaqaaqay).
The other conflict might even have been better; at least we could get
out, we could move around even if a bullet hits you. And now we miss
that… . You just sit around (waaba saas u yuurur). (Ebla A. Hersi)

Additionally, the Kenyan police stationed in the camps to protect
the vulnerable also reportedly commit violence against refugees. Consequently, banditry, coupled with fear and distrust of those responsible for their protection, renders the situation of refugees—especially
women—doubly precarious. The security situation in Dadaab has
improved only minimally, as is clear from the statistics above. The
scope of this crisis is illustrated by Verdirame. In his assessment of
the human rights abuses in Kenyan camps, he accuses the UNHCR of
“administering the camps in ways which often appear to be blatant
disregard of international human rights standards.”35
A comparison of the incidents of rape in Dadaab, with a population
of 130,000, to those reported in 2002 for Mogadishu, the most dangerous and violent city in Somalia for the past decade, with a population
of over one million, illustrates the magnitude of insecurity prevailing
in Dadaab. A Somali human rights group active in Mogadishu, the Dr.
Ismael Jumale Human Rights Centre (DIJHRC), documented 32 rape
cases in Mogadishu for 2002.36 Though this number is probably a gross
underestimation of the actual number of rapes committed by militias
in Mogadishu, it nevertheless underscores the seriousness of insecurity
faced by women in Dadaab camps. Furthermore, the high incidence of
violence in Dadaab is also a clear indication of the failure of the host
state to protect refugees in its territory.
V. Host State and Refugee Crisis
A host state plays a crucial role in the reception of refugees and the
type of settlement offered to them: either integration with the host
population or existing in limbo in peripheral regions. Geopolitics is
often key to these decisions. For example, Western nations encouraged
refugees from the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War, whereas, following the end of the East-West divide, the reception of refugees from the
Balkan wars was tepid at best. Moreover, regional conflicts can encour26
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age or discourage refugee flows from neighboring countries; that is,
the masses on the move become a tool to discredit the other side or
to avoid a spillover of political turmoil in neighboring countries. The
latter is especially the case when people in the host state include some
of the same ethnic group(s) as the refugees. For instance, neighboring
countries with historical border disputes, such as Somalia and Ethiopia, each encouraged refugees from the other side in the 1970s and
80s, whereas Kenya, with the collapse of Somalia in 1991, was hostile
to the influx. In the latter case, the Kenyan Government’s encampment
policies are closely tied to the fear that the new arrivals could endanger political order in the country. Containment of refugees in closed
camps, then, facilitates the monitoring of undesirable activities.
A host state’s policies toward a refugee crisis are also partially dictated by the pressures it experiences from the Western powers, which
control the purses of “aid” and “loans.” Kenya, for instance, already
facing reduction of aid due to its human rights record, used the Somali
refugee crisis to negotiate for a continuation of international aid: “On
the one hand, the presence of large numbers of Somali refugees in
Kenya was held as evidence of Kenya’s improved human rights record.
On the other, Kenyan authorities threatened to return these refugees
forcibly if a renewal of aid was not forthcoming.”37 Host governments,
in addition, influence the perceptions of the wider host population.
The scapegoating of refugees as responsible for all the social and economic ills (which often predate the arrival of refugees) compounds the
resentment toward an already disfranchised populace construed as
foreign and undesirable.38 The situation of Somali refugees in Kenyan
camps is, therefore, intrinsically tied to the colonially inherited border
disputes between post-independence Somalia and Kenya, and to the
marginal position Somali-Kenyans occupy within the Kenyan state.
Finding solutions to protracted refugee situations, such as those
in the Dadaab camps, remains a challenge for the international community. However, narrow definitions of the best course of action to
address the crisis often result in the perpetuation of an untenable condition for millions.
VI. Durable Solutions:
Prospects of Integration, Resettlement, and Repatriation
Most refugees in Dadaab are familiar with the three preferred solutions
to refugee crises as stipulated by the international refugee regime: inte-
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gration into the host society, resettlement in a third country, or repatriation to the country of origin. Of the 130 refugees who participated
in conversations with Adelman and Abdi during a 2003 CARE Canada
consultancy field trip in Dadaab, the majority reiterated the need to
implement one of these options to terminate their encampment.39 However, none of these potential solutions have yet been implemented. On
the contrary, the camp life has assumed a degree of permanence.
As the comments about the Kenyan Government’s treatment of
Somali refugees illustrate, integration into the host country has not
been tried as a viable option. This is because of the assumption that
the policy would immediately be met by very vocal opposition from
landless locals. Serious economic and political challenges confronting
Kenyans eliminate any possibility for the provision of land to refugees
or the acceptance of integrating them. Furthermore, Kenya’s reluctance
to pass a refugee bill that has been under discussion for years now,
despite the fact that it has been hosting very large numbers of Somali
and Sudanese refugees from the 1980s onward, testifies to its ambivalence. Consequently, refugees in Kenya still lack any legal recognition
within the Kenyan political system, despite Kenya’s ratification of the
refugee conventions of both the U.N. and the Organization of African
Unity (OAU). All responsibility then falls on the UNHCR.
If integration is not a viable alternative, both resettlement and repatriation have also remained elusive for Somali refugees in Dadaab
camps. The percentage of resettled persons worldwide amounts to
a dismally small number. Of the more than twenty million persons
dispersed around the world in 2002, 55,500 (or just about 0.3 percent)
were resettled in a third country.40 The numbers of Somali refugees
resettled by traditional refugee-receiving countries, such as Canada,
the United States, and Australia, have further diminished since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States. For example,
the 2002 UNHCR Annual Statistical Report shows that the number of
resettled Somalis for that year was 640: 295 went to the U.S., 159 to
New Zealand, 116 to Canada, and smaller numbers to the Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden.41 The current rhetoric on “terrorism” that dominates the immigration policies of most Western nations, and the bombing incidents in Kenya in which Somalis were implicated, account for
this decrease. These dismal numbers highlight the limited opportunities for resettlement that exist for refugees in general, and particularly
for Somali Muslims, since the September 11, 2001, attacks.42 This also
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underscores the problematic nature of this option as a solution to end
the state of limbo in which large numbers of refugees find themselves.
Repatriation has also remained impossible for most in Dadaab.
Herein, however, lies a dilemma. Refugees and UNHCR differ on the
feasibility of this option. Only a small percentage of the thousands in
Dadaab who in 2001 signed up with the UNHCR for voluntary repatriation have so far returned, mainly to the Northeastern region of
Somalia. This is in stark contrast to Somali refugees in camps in Ethiopia, the majority having already repatriated to the Northwest. The
UNHCR reports that 220 refugees were repatriated from the Dadaab
camps in 2002 and about 500 in 2003.43 The UNHCR also claims that
funding constraints hinder its ability to repatriate the Somali refugees
in Dadaab. Adelman and Abdi’s consultations with refugee groups
in Dadaab revealed an overwhelming preference for voluntary repatriation, provided there is some financial assistance to restart life.44
Despite the fact that many refugees in Dadaab come from minority kin
groups and/or rural backgrounds in the southern regions of Somalia,
most expressed a willingness to repatriate to other regions, mainly in
the northeast and northwest of Somalia, if provided with some financial assistance to do so. Many insisted that they are very aware of the
material and physical insecurities existing in many parts of Somalia.
However, they also argued that worse material and physical circumstances persist in the Dadaab camps. They cited the Somali proverb,
“laba kala daran mid dooro” (choose the least of two evils). Regardless of
the risks involved in life in Somalia, refugees argue that they would at
least have freedom of movement and the possibility to seek employment. But with diminishing funding for all other aspects of administering the camps, UNHCR claims that it is unable to fulfill the desires of
thousands of refugees.
Adelman et al. proposed an alternative to the costly yet inadequate
care and maintenance that have been provided to those in Dadaab for
the last twelve years. This proposal stresses that repatriation for most
Somali refugees should seriously be considered:
We recommend that a meeting be held of donors so that they pledge to
give the same monies they now give for camp operations over the next
five years, but an appropriate committee of international agencies be
given authority to use those guarantees to obtain present funding for
repatriation in flexible ways to find the various durable solutions for the
different groups of refugees and different choices refugees make. The
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refugees will return, but with conditions, conditions that deal with their
material security and security of education for their children.45

This proposal emphasized giving refugees real choices. Here, it is
important to highlight that resettlement is not a viable choice for most
refugees. This will, however, be encouraged for small groups of refugees, such as some minority groups who feel they cannot return to
Somalia, vulnerable women and their children, and so on. As Kumin
argued in her address at the 2003 Group of 78 (G78) Annual Policy
Conference in Ottawa, options like the one proposed here actually fit
well with the current High Commissioner’s proposed “Convention
Plus.” Consistent with Adelman and Abdi’s insistence on avoiding
the narrowly defined mantra of “durable solutions,” Convention Plus
is about “develop[ing] new tools for today’s problems.” These tools
include:
[C]omprehensive plans of action to ensure more effective and predictable responses to mass influx or to protracted refugee situations; development assistance targeted to achieve more equitable burden-sharing
and to promote self-reliance of refugees and returnees; multilateral commitments for resettlement of refugees; and the delineation of roles and
responsibilities of countries of origin, transit and destination. The underlying premise is that specific commitments will lend themselves better to
binding agreements than broad policy exhortations.46

Durable solutions as they stand now are no more than exhortations,
often amounting to no commitment from the international community. Exploring other options and freeing refugees from “imaginary”
solutions for their plight should be at the top of the agenda of refugeeassisting organizations. Also, these options should include an international concerted effort to contribute to peace-building initiatives in the
refugee-producing regions, which will go far in expediting the end of
the miserable condition of uncertainty.
VII. Conclusion
This analysis has attempted to highlight the constraints refugees in
limbo face in their protracted camp life. It was argued that dependency
on aid in Dadaab remains the main option open to most refugees, not
because of lack of initiative to provide for one’s family, but rather due to
the absence of alternative means of livelihood for the majority. In addi30
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tion, research clearly indicates that the refugees’ sense of self-worth
was affected by their status. “Refugee” identity is painted as undesirable and even dreaded. Moreover, violence, especially gender violence,
remains epidemic in Dadaab, and insecurity remains a top concern for
all. With Dadaab in its second decade of existence and world attention
currently focused on the war on “terrorism” and the war in Iraq, securing funding for refugees in protracted situations in peripheral regions
is becoming extremely hard for international organizations.
Given the grim picture painted by these findings, it is paramount
that states that are signatories to the U.N. covenants on human rights
endorse national legislation for the rights of refugees in agreement
with international laws. This would certainly go a long way toward
reducing the desperately protracted situations of refugees in many
parts of the world. Even if governments are ultimately responsible for
settlement policies (and not international organizations, which have
“no army or access to coercive power to act on behalf of refugees”47),
international organizations can and should do more to maximize their
presence in host countries. Regrettably, once the emergency phase
passes, inertia of the international humanitarian bodies administering the camps and the international community’s will to find solutions sets in. Yet the scholarly literature provides us with enough case
studies and lessons to avoid repeating the same old scenarios when
responding to future crises: the creation of camps as temporary solutions.
On the contrary, camps turned into semi-permanent settlements create
despair and insecurity. In other words, the long-term consequences
of closed camps—where people are segregated from the general host
population, where freedom of movement is dramatically curtailed,
where a state resembling a “total institution” prevails, and where refugees are in limbo in all aspects of daily life—create a host of new
and disabling problems. The choice seems to be stark: either condemn
human beings who have already been dealt a cruel hand to a life bereft
of adequate sustenance and dignity or act promptly and competently
to explore other alternatives that effectively address protracted refugee
situations. Relevant national governments, international organizations,
and the larger global community are in a position to make that choice.
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